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Abstract 
 
Using close to 800,000 (2,000,000) transactions by 66,000 (303,000) households in the 
United States (in Finland), we show that individual investors with longer holding periods 
choose to hold less liquid stocks in their portfolios, consistent with Amihud and Mendelson’s 
(1986) theory of liquidity clienteles. The relationship between holding periods and 
transaction costs is stronger amongst more financially sophisticated households.  Households 
whose holding periods are positively related to transaction costs also earn higher gross 
returns on their investments before accounting for transaction costs, suggesting that attention 
to non-salient transaction costs is an indication of investing ability. We confirm our findings 
by analyzing changes to investors’ holding periods around exogenous shocks to stock 
liquidity. 
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1. Introduction 
In a theoretical model, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) show that transaction costs cause a 
clientele effect in equity markets.  Investors with longer holding periods choose to hold stocks 
with higher transaction costs in equilibrium.  Amihud and Mendelson (1986) emphasize that this 
relationship between transaction costs and holding periods of investors represents a rational 
response by an efficient market.  Counter to Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) conjecture that 
investors understand and incorporate the impact of transaction costs, recent findings in the 
behavioral finance literature suggest that individual investors have bounded rationality and tend 
to ignore non-salient costs when making investment decisions.  In this paper, we use the trading 
records of households in the US and in Finland, to investigate whether individual investors are 
cognizant of transaction costs when making trading decisions and hold illiquid securities longer 
as stipulated by Amihud and Mendelson (1986), or whether they ignore transaction costs 
consistent with the findings in the behavioral finance literature. 
There is evidence that investors ignore non-salient costs as they relate to mutual fund fees. 
Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005) show that investors pay attention only to the salient costs of 
mutual funds, but ignore hidden operating costs. Consistent with these findings Gil-Bazo and 
Verdu (2008, 2009) document that there is a negative relation between mutual funds' before-fee 
performance and the fees they charge to investors.  Surveys also suggest that retail investors do 
not understand all costs associated with investing in mutual funds (NASD Investor Literacy 
Survey 2003; Alexander, Jones, and Nigro, 1998).
1
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 For example, only 21% of the retail investors that responded to NASD Investor Literacy Survey (2003) knew the 
meaning of a “no load” mutual fund. 
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There is also evidence that investors do not pay attention to non-salient costs in other 
domains.  Hossain and Morgan (2006), using a field experiment, show that buyers in Ebay 
auctions ignore shipping costs that are not as salient as the price of the item being auctioned. 
Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2009), document that consumers underreact to taxes that are not 
salient. Similarly Finkelstein (2009) finds that drivers are less aware of tolls paid electronically 
and estimates that tolls are 20 to 40 percent higher than they would have been without electronic 
toll collection. These findings suggest that individual investors may not fully understand and 
incorporate non-salient transaction costs such as bid-ask spreads and price impact when trading.   
Consistent with this notion of investors not paying attention to non-salient costs, a number of 
studies have found that individual investors tend to overtrade and lose substantial amounts to 
transaction costs without any gain in performance.  Barber and Odean (2000), for instance, show 
that while there is little difference in the gross performance of individual investors who trade 
frequently and those who trade infrequently, the net returns of infrequent traders are higher by 
about 7% per year, after accounting for transaction costs. Barber and Odean (2000) attribute their 
findings to individual investors’ overconfidence.2 
However, losses incurred by individual investors after accounting for transaction costs do not 
necessarily imply that these investors are not paying attention to transaction costs.   First, 
investors can trade for a variety of reasons other than information or behavioral biases. Investors 
may trade when they experience income shocks (Lynch and Tan 2011) or when they experience 
                                                 
2
 Similarly, Barber et al. (2009), using a complete transaction history of all investors in Taiwan, find that individual 
investor losses due to transaction costs equal 2.2 % of GDP, without any gain in performance. French (2008) finds 
that, each year, investors spend about 0.67% of the aggregate value of the market on transaction costs, again without 
any gain in performance. He estimates the capitalized cost of active investing to be at least 10% of the total market 
capitalization.   
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exogenous liquidity shocks (Huang 2003). Second, even if most of the overtrading by individual 
investors could be attributed to overconfidence, there is no reason for such investors to not be 
paying attention to transaction costs. In this paper, we directly test whether investors pay 
attention to transaction costs by examining the relationship between transaction costs and the 
holding periods of individual investors. Rather than focusing on trading performance alone, we 
analyze if individual investors understand the trade-offs between selling an illiquid asset more 
quickly than a liquid one. This amounts to testing the first proposition in Amihud and Mendelson 
(1986) that investors will hold stocks with higher transaction costs longer compared to stocks 
with lower transaction costs.   
In order to test Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) first proposition, we model investors’ sell 
versus hold decisions with survival analyses using 799,469 transactions made by 66,000 US 
households.  In particular, we model investors’ holding periods using Cox hazard regressions.  
Our findings are three-fold.  First, we find that transaction costs are an important determinant of 
investors’ holding periods after controlling for various household and stock characteristics, 
confirming Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) predictions. Specifically, we find that a stock in the 
highest transaction cost decile is 40% less likely to be sold compared to a more liquid stock with 
similar firm and investor characteristics conditional on the stock not having been sold up to that 
point in time.  
We confirm our results by analyzing transactions data from Finland, which serves as an “out-
of-sample” verification of the US findings. Almost identical to the US results, we find that a 
stock in the highest transaction cost decile in Finland is 40% less likely to be sold compared to a 
stock that has lower transaction costs with similar firm and investor characteristics. Since the 
dataset from Finland includes the complete transactions of all Finnish households between 1995 
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and 2003, the results suggest that our findings can be generalized to the full cross-section of 
households.  Our results are robust to various controls, different measures of transaction costs 
and to controlling for firm and household specific effects. 
Second, we find that households differ in how much attention they pay to the transaction 
costs of the securities they trade. Specifically, we find that investors who are more financially 
sophisticated pay more attention to transaction costs. We follow the extant literature and assume 
that financial sophistication is correlated with education, occupation and resources available to 
an investor such as income and wealth. We also use information contained in investors’ trades to 
identify sophisticated investors.  In particular, we classify households who trade options, foreign 
securities and hold short positions as financially more sophisticated.  A number of papers have 
shown significant variation in trading ability and performance in the cross-section of individual 
traders (see for instance, Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001 and Coval, Hirshleifer, and Shumway 
2005). Our findings suggest that investor sophistication plays a role in how much attention 
investors pay to transaction costs as well.  
Third, we find that investors who pay closer attention to transaction costs make better 
investment decisions overall. In particular, we find that households whose holding periods are 
positively correlated with transaction costs have higher gross returns (before accounting for 
transaction costs) compared to households whose holding periods are negatively correlated with 
transaction costs. It would not be surprising to find that investors who do not pay attention to 
transaction costs to have lower net returns (after accounting for transaction costs). The fact that 
we find these investors to have lower gross returns suggests that paying closer attention to 
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transaction costs is a sign of investor ability.  As expected, we find that investors who pay 
attention to transaction costs realize lower spreads in trades.
3
     
  There is likely to be endogeneity in the relationship between holding periods and measures 
of transaction costs used in this paper.  As trading interest in a stock increases the costs 
associated with transacting the stock decreases. We should note however the baseline or the 
average costs of transacting a given stock is likely to change slowly over time.  There are also 
likely other exogenous factors that determine the liquidity level of a given stock, such as the size 
of the company in terms of revenues or assets. For instance, the liquidity level of a penny stock, 
would increase with increased trading interest, but it’s not likely to achieve the same level of 
liquidity of a large cap stock purely based on investor interest or attention. Nonetheless, in order 
to address potential endogeneity concerns, we study investor behavior around periods of quasi-
exogenous liquidity shocks.   
Specifically, we examine how holding periods change around stock split events. A long line 
of literature documents a significant reduction in transaction costs and increase in liquidity 
subsequent to stock splits.
4
 It has also been documented that post-split performance of splitting 
firms is statistically indistinguishable from non-splitting firms with similar characteristics when 
                                                 
3
 Spreads are computed as in Barber and Odean (2000) as the percentage difference between the transaction price 
and the CRSP closing price.   
 
4
 The prior literature suggests that liquidity increases after stock splits. For example Schultz (2000) shows that the 
number of trades, especially small trades, increases significantly subsequent to stock splits. Desai, Nimalendran, and 
Venkataraman (1998) find that both informed trades and noise trades increase after stock splits.  Kryzanowski and 
Zhang (1996) show that absolute trading volumes of Canadian stocks increase subsequent to stock splits. Conroy, 
Harris, and Benet (1990) also show a significant reduction in the absolute bid-ask spread following stock splits. 
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appropriate firm controls are used (Byun and Rozeff 2003).
5
 In other words, splits do not appear 
to provide a signal to the market about the future prospects of the splitting firm, as some 
theoretical papers suggest.  Taken together, these two findings would imply that the transaction 
costs channel is the main channel through which a stock split could affect the average holding 
period of households.  
Consistent with the prior literature, we first verify that transaction costs decrease (stock 
liquidity increases) subsequent to stock splits in our sample time-period.  Then we show that 
investors’ average holding period declines in response to the increase in liquidity following stock 
splits. Our analysis suggests that the holding period for a stock decreases by about 37 trading 
days, or nearly two trading months after a stock-split. This finding is economically significant as 
the mean holding period, defined as the number of trading days from the first purchase of a stock 
to the first sale, is 185 days.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the hypotheses tested 
in the paper. Section 3 describes the individual transaction data sets and the construction of the 
main liquidity variables used in this study. Section 4 reports our main findings using US trades 
that show the relationship between transaction costs and holding periods. Section 5 studies the 
implications of liquidity decisions of individual investors on their investment performance, and 
empirically documents that households who pay closer attention to transaction costs earn higher 
raw and characteristics-adjusted excess returns. Section 6 provides robustness tests to address 
concerns that holding periods are determined endogenously and also uses individual transactions 
from Finland as an out-of-sample test to verify US results. Section 7 concludes.  
                                                 
5
 In particular, Byun and Rozeff (2003) document that post-split equity return performance of splitting firms is 
statistically indistinguishable from non-splitting firms with similar characteristics.   
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2. Hypotheses  
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) develop a model where risk neutral investors with different 
exogenous holding periods and limited capital trade securities subject to fixed transaction costs. 
They show that transaction costs result in a clientele effect, with investors who have longer 
holding periods selecting to hold illiquid stocks in equilibrium.  
Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) model assumes that the holding periods of investors are 
exogenously determined. This static model has been extended to incorporate dynamic decisions 
of investors to endogenize the holding period (Constantinides 1986, Vayanos 1998, Vayanos and 
Vila 1999, Heaton and Lucas 1996, Huang 2003, Lynch and Tan 2011, Lo, Mamaysky and 
Wang 2004).  These dynamic models differ in their assessment about the magnitude of 
transaction costs on assets’ prices, but they are similar to Amihud and Mendelson (1986) in that 
they also expect investors’ holding periods to positively correlate with transaction costs.  
Furthermore, while Amihud and Mendelson (1986) model each investor with a fixed holding 
period, models with endogenous trading horizons allow for investors to have different trading 
horizons for each asset.  To accommodate the possibility that an investor’s holding period could 
be different for each stock, we conduct our analyses at the transaction level.   We empirically test 
whether households’ holding periods are positively related to transactions. Our first hypothesis 
is: 
 H1: Holding periods of households are positively related to measures of transaction costs, 
after controlling for investor and stock characteristics.  
 
Previous studies have shown that, on average, households’ stock investments perform poorly. 
Odean (1999), for instance, reports that individual investors’ purchases under-perform their sales 
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by a significant margin.  However, other studies have concluded that there exists a subset of 
retail investors who display greater financial sophistication and market understanding than the 
average retail investor. For instance, Coval, Hirshleifer, and Shumway (2005) document strong 
persistence in the performance of individual investors’ trades, suggesting that some skillful 
individual investors might be able to earn positive abnormal profits. Feng and Seasholes (2005) 
find that investor sophistication reduces a well-known behavioral bias, the disposition effect. 
Ivkovic, Sialm and Weisbenner (2008) propose and empirically document that individual 
investors who hold more concentrated portfolios are financially more sophisticated as they 
possess informational advantages that allow them to outperform investors with diversified 
portfolios. Li, Geng, Subrahmanyam, and Yu (2016) show that wealthy investors profitably trade 
around companies’ announcements of high stock dividends, particularly those registered in their 
localities.  
Given that previous studies have documented heterogeneity in the performance and 
investment decisions of individual investors, we expect to find similar cross-sectional differences 
in the correlation between holding periods and transaction costs across households. In particular, 
we expect such differences to occur due to differences in financial sophistication. We follow the 
extant literature and assume that financial sophistication is correlated with education, occupation 
and resources available to an investor such as income and wealth. We also use information 
contained in investors’ trades to identify sophisticated investors.  The first part of our second 
hypothesis is: 
 
H2.a: The correlation between holding periods and transactions costs is higher for financially 
more sophisticated investors. 
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The correlation between holding periods and transaction costs is likely to impact portfolio 
performance on both a gross (before accounting for transaction costs) and a net (after accounting 
for transaction costs) basis.  Households who do not pay attention to transaction costs when they 
trade are likely to have lower net returns due to transaction costs. As mentioned earlier, previous 
studies have shown investor sophistication to be correlated with higher portfolio performance 
and lower levels of behavioral biases.  We conjecture that paying closer attention to the impact 
of transaction costs could be a sign of financial sophistication and market knowledge leading to 
better overall portfolio performance.  We predict that households whose holding periods are 
positively correlated with transaction costs should have higher trading ability and earn higher 
gross returns in addition to earning higher net returns compared to households whose holding 
periods are negatively correlated with transaction costs.  Hence, the second part of our second 
hypothesis is: 
 
H2.b: Households who pay closer attention to transaction costs earn higher gross returns 
before accounting for transaction costs. 
 
In testing the above hypothesis, we consider both raw portfolio returns as well as characteristics-
adjusted returns computed as in Daniel et al (1997). 
 
3. Data 
3.1 Household Transactions and Demographics 
This study uses two distinct datasets in order to explore the trading behaviors of households. 
The first dataset contains transactions for a subset of individual investors in the United States, 
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while the second dataset contains transactions of all investors in Finland. The individual trade 
data for the United States comes from a major U.S. discount brokerage house. It records the daily 
trading of 78,000 households from January 1991 to December 1996 and is the same dataset used 
in Barber and Odean (2000). We focus only on the common stock transactions of households in 
this study, which account for nearly two-thirds of the total value of household investments. We 
exclude from the current analysis investments in mutual funds (both open-end and closed-end), 
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), warrants, and options. About 66,000 out of the 78,000 
households trade common stocks, making about eight hundred thousand transactions over the 
sample period. The transaction record includes the number of shares traded, the price traded, 
each household’s month-end positions, and value of their position at market close. The dataset 
also includes demographic information for a smaller sub-sample of households, such as income, 
age, gender, occupation and marital status.
6
 A comparison of this dataset with Survey of 
Consumer Finances, IRS and TAQ data has shown it to be representative of U.S. individual 
investors (Ivkovic, Sialm, and Weisbenner 2008, Ivkovic, Poterba, and Weisbenner 2005, and 
Barber, Odean, and Zhu 2006).   
To address concerns that our findings are specific to the data we employ, we repeat the 
analyses using a similar dataset from Finland which reports the complete trading records of all 
market participants.
7
 This dataset comes from the central register in the Finnish Central 
Securities Depository (FCSD). The register officially records all the trades of all Finnish 
                                                 
6
 For a more detailed description of this dataset please refer to Barber and Odean (2000, 2001) 
 
7
 The analyses regarding Finland have been taken from Yıldızhan’s unpublished project titled “Individual Trading 
Decisions in Financial Markets.”  The said project utilizes data from the Helsinki Stock Exchange (HEX). We thank 
Jussi Keppo for providing us with this unique dataset. 
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investors - both individual and institutional- on a daily basis from January 1995 to December 
2003. For purposes of this current study, we only utilize the trades of individual investors in 
Finland. Similar to the U.S. dataset, the Finnish dataset reports for each transaction, the number 
of shares traded and the daily closing price. Furthermore, we observe the initial holdings for each 
account at the beginning of the dataset, allowing us to keep track of the holdings of households 
on a daily basis. The dataset also reports individuals’ demographic information, such as age and 
gender. We do not have information about income, occupation, and marital status. A more 
detailed description of the Finnish dataset could be found in Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000, 
2001).  
 
3.2 Measures of Transaction Costs 
Transactions costs are a multi-faceted concept, and are usually defined in terms of the costs 
and risks associated with transacting financial securities. These costs capture price impact, 
asymmetric information and inventory risk. In this study we use three different measures of 
transaction costs previously utilized in the literature.  In particular, we use the adjusted Amihud 
ratio (AdjIlliq), Roll’s measure (Roll’s C), and zero return frequency (Zerofreq), which can be 
calculated using data that is available for both the United States and Finland.  
The first measure is the Amihud illiquidity ratio from Amihud (2002), calculated as: 
 
                                                           𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 =  
1
𝐷𝑖,𝑡
∑
|𝑟𝑖,𝑑|
𝑑𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑑
𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑑=1
                                                                (1) 
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𝑟𝑖,𝑑 is the daily stock return for firm i in day d. 𝑑𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑑 is the dollar volume in day d. 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the 
number of trading days in month t. 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 is Amihud’s illiquidity measure. t. The Amihud 
measure is similar to Kyle’s lambda and captures the price impact of a trade. We adjust the 
Amihud measure as in Acharya and Pedersen (2005) to remove outliers and to make it 
stationary: 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 = min [0.25 + 30 × 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑀𝑡−1, 30].  𝑀𝑡−1 is the ratio of value-
weighted market portfolio at the end of the month t-1 to that of the market portfolio in July of 
1962. The higher the adjusted Amihud ratio, the more illiquid the stock is. 
The second measure we use is the Bayesian version of Roll’s (1984) transaction cost 
measure: 
 
                                            𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = {
√−𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖,𝑡, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1)           𝑖𝑓𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖,𝑡, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1) < 0;
0                                               𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.
                           (2) 
 
It is based on the model 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖,𝑡𝛥𝑞𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 where 𝑞𝑖,𝑡 is a trade direction indicator, 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 is the 
transaction cost measure, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is an error term, all for stock i at time t. Roll’s measure (Roll’s 
C) is derived under the assumption that buyer- and seller-initiated trades are equally likely. The 
Bayesian estimation of this cost measure using the Gibbs sampler is described in detail in 
Hasbrouck (2009). The higher the Roll’s C, the more illiquid the stock is. 
The third liquidity measure captures the proportion of trading days with zero returns.  The 
frequency of zero-return days as a liquidity proxy was introduced by Lesmond, Ogden, and 
Trzcinka (1999). We compute the proportion of days with zero returns for each stock within each 
year to estimate Zerofreq. The higher the Zerofreq, the more illiquid the stock is. To reduce 
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potential endogeneity arising from contemporaneous measurement and to smooth out 
idiosyncratic changes, we use the twelve month moving average of each liquidity measure in our 
analyses.   
Table 1 reports summary statistics for stock and investor characteristics for the US.
8
 Only 
stocks that are traded by households in the dataset are considered. Summary statistics are 
calculated by pooling annual observations over the 1991-1996 time period. The results show that 
our major transaction costs measure – adjusted Amihud ratio (AdjIlliq) - is positively skewed 
with a mean of 3.30, but a much smaller median of 0.46. The distributions of other transaction 
costs measures are similarly positively skewed as Roll’s C has a mean of 1.73 and a median of 
1.06 and Zerofreq has a mean of 4.82% and a median of 2.70%. Size is also positively skewed, 
with the average market capitalization almost 8 times as large as the median firm size.  
The mean (median) US individual investor’s portfolio value is $80,342 ($22,952) for the 
transactions analyzed in this study. 10% of the primary US account holders for the transactions 
analyzed in this study are female. US individual investors utilize short-trades frequently as 38% 
of the accounts have held a short position at some time over the sample period analyzed. 14% of 
US individual investors have traded options at least once over the sample period and 22% of 
them have traded foreign securities. 66% of the US individual investors in our transactions 
dataset hold technical or managerial positions. The mean (median) US individual investor’s 
annual income over the time period studied is $76,840 ($87,500). The mean (median) US 
individual investor’s portfolio concentration is .52 (.48), which roughly corresponds to holding 
two stocks with equal dollar weights of 50%. 
                                                 
8
 We report stock and investor characteristics for Finland in Table 7 and discuss the analyses for Finland in Section 
6. 
14 
 
4. Transaction Costs and Holding Periods in the US 
4.1 Holding periods and Transaction Costs 
In this section, we provide empirical evidence in support of the first hypothesis (H1): 
Holding periods are positively related to measures of transaction costs, after controlling for 
investor and stock characteristics. We begin by computing a holding period for each transaction 
in the dataset.
9
 The holding period is defined as the number of trading days from the first 
purchase of a stock to the first sale, following the approach of Seru, Shumway, and Stoffman 
(2010).
10
 This generates 799,469 holding period observations, with a mean (median) of 185 (86) 
trading days for retail investors in the United States.  
Figure 1 shows the median holding periods for transactions grouped by investors’ age, 
account type, the amount of capital they have invested in the stock market, as well as 
transactions grouped by the underlying stocks’ transaction costs.11 The median holding period is 
longer for stocks held in retirement accounts. Investors who are older and who have less wealth 
invested in the market have longer holding periods. There is also a strong negative relationship 
between holding periods and liquidity of stocks traded by the investors in the dataset.  
Next, we rank and assign the 799,469 holding period observations to ten groups based on the 
length of the respective holding periods. For the stocks in each group, we then calculate averages 
                                                 
9
 We also estimate portfolio level holding periods and transaction costs for each investor in the dataset. Our analysis 
of investor portfolios yields results consistent with transaction-level analysis. As explained in the Introduction 
section, transaction-level analysis allows for the same investor to have different holding periods for different assets 
and as such is more in line with models that assume endogenous trading horizons. 
   
10
 We obtain similar results by alternatively defining the holding period as the number of trading days from first 
purchase till the day when all positive positions are closed as in Feng and Seasholes (2005).  
 
11
 In the figure, a stock is defined as Illiquid if it belongs to the highest transaction cost decile of stocks ranked 
according to the adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio. Other category includes all other stocks not in the highest 
transaction cost decile. 
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for the three transaction costs measures of interest as well as price, and market capitalization. 
The transaction costs measures are calculated as of the purchase day, by averaging transaction 
costs measures over the previous 12 months. The results are reported in Table 2, where we find a 
strong positive univariate relationship between holding periods and the average transaction costs 
of the stocks in each holding period decile. The relationship is monotonic and does not appear to 
be a simple function of price or market capitalization. The adjusted Amihud illiquidity measure, 
for instance, increases monotonically from 0.92 for the shortest holding period decile to 1.83 for 
the longest holding period decile. The differences in the average liquidity of the stocks traded in 
the top and the bottom deciles of holding period are always significant regardless of the liquidity 
measure we utilize. Roll’s C measure increases monotonically from 0.66 to 0.82, while the 
percentage of zero return days also increases monotonically from 2.52% to 3.83% from the 
shortest holding period decile to the longest holding period decile. 
Figure 2 shows this relationship graphically. We plot Kaplan-Meier survival probabilities for 
stocks that are in the highest illiquidity decile using the adjusted Amihud illiquidity measure, and 
for all other stocks in the dataset. The x-axis shows the number of days that have passed since 
the purchase of a stock, and the two lines plot the probability of an investor holding a stock 
conditional upon no sale up to that point in time. The lighter gray line plots the survival 
probability for stocks in the most illiquid decile, while the black line is for the rest of the sample.  
The graph shows that stocks ranked in the highest illiquidity decile have significantly higher 
survival probabilities, which suggests that investors tend to hold the most illiquid stocks for 
longer periods of time before selling them. This analysis provides initial evidence that holding 
periods are strongly related to measures of transaction costs.  
16 
 
We next move on to perform more detailed analyses that controls for related stock and 
investor characteristics. In particular, we use a hazard model to analyze the relationship between 
holding periods and transaction costs.
12
  This framework allows us to control for the confounding 
effects of stock and investor characteristics. With hazard models, an investor’s trade decision 
regarding a specific asset can be explicitly modeled by considering the investor’s sell versus hold 
decision each day. In this paper, we use a Cox proportional hazard model.
13
 The hazard model 
takes the following form: 
 
ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡)𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽
′𝑋 + 𝜃′𝑍𝑡)  (3) 
  
This proposed hazard model is a statistical framework that describes how long an investor in the 
dataset will hold a stock before selling it. The left hand side variable,  ℎ(𝑡), is the hazard rate, the 
probability of selling a stock on day t conditional upon holding that stock until that point in time. 
X is a vector of explanatory variables which are static and do not change over time, and Zt are 
time-varying covariates which can take on different values at each point in time. ℎ0(𝑡) is called 
the baseline hazard rate and describes the average hazard rate when the independent covariates 
are equal to zero. Using the Cox (1972) estimator one can estimate coefficients on X and Zt 
without specifying a baseline ℎ0(𝑡) hazard rate. Positions that are not closed by the end of the 
sample period are treated as censored observations within the hazard framework.   
                                                 
12
 The hazard model framework has been used in the past by Seru, Shumway and Stoffman (2010) as well as Feng 
and Seasholes (2005) to model holding periods of individual investors. 
 
13
 Details about estimating the proportional hazard model can be found in Cox and Oakes (1984). 
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The covariates used in the main analyses include a set of variables related to the 
demographics of the investors, such as age, income, gender, marital status, employment status 
and occupation, as well as another set of variables related to the characteristics of the stocks they 
trade, such as liquidity, size, book-to-market ratio, and momentum. We control for size, book-to-
market ratio, and momentum in the model to account for investors’ preferences for certain stock 
characteristics that are known to be associated with expected returns. As there is likely to be 
seasonality in purchases and sales, year and calendar month dummies are also included in the 
hazard regressions.
14
  
Following standard reporting conventions, we report hazard ratios instead of estimated 
coefficients from the hazard regression in Panel A of Table 3. The hazard ratio is similar to the 
odds ratio estimated from a binary choice model and is defined as the ratio of two hazard 
functions when one explanatory variable is changed by one unit holding everything else equal. In 
the current context, the hazard ratio reports the marginal effect of higher exposure to an 
explanatory variable on the probability of selling vs. holding the stock. A hazard ratio that is less 
than one would suggest that a higher exposure to the explanatory variable will reduce the 
probability of selling the stock versus holding it.  In other words, a higher exposure to the 
explanatory variable would lead to a higher likelihood of holding on to the stock. Similarly, a 
hazard ratio larger than one would suggest that a higher exposure to the explanatory variable 
would increase the likelihood of selling the stock. 
In column (1) of Table 3-Panel A, we report the hazard ratio for the adjusted Amihud 
illiquidity ratio (AdjIlliq) without taking into account stock or investor characteristics.  The 
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 Open stock positions, for instance, may be closed out in December for tax reasons. 
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estimated hazard ratio for the adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio is 0.981 and statistically 
significant, implying that the higher the transaction cost of a stock is, the less likely it will be 
sold. We obtain similar results using Roll’s C and the Zero-frequency measures which are 
reported in columns (2) and (3) respectively. Overall, these results are consistent with the 
univariate sorts – investors’ holding periods are higher for illiquid stocks.    
Households may not have the same preferences and could potentially have different baseline 
holding periods.  Specification in column (1) does not take into account this potential 
heterogeneity across investors. One way to account for heterogeneity across households within a 
hazard framework is to assume different baseline hazard rates for each household, but compute 
common coefficients on the explanatory variables. Such a model is estimated by partial 
likelihood using the method of stratification.  By doing household level stratification, we allow 
for the possibility of each household to a have a different baseline holding period.  This is similar 
to using household fixed effects in OLS regressions.  Similarly, by using firm stratification, we 
allow for the possibility of each stock having a different average holding period.   In column (4) 
in Table 3-Panel A, we report the results of a hazard analysis similar to the one in column (1) by 
additionally accounting for household and firm specific effects using both firm and household 
level stratification.
15
  
Results reported in column (4) show that the impact of transaction costs on the probability of 
a sale increases once we control for household and firm specific effects.  The estimated hazard 
ratio for the adjusted Amihud illiquidity measure is reduced from 0.981 (column 1) to 0.973 
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 We obtain similar results using Roll’s C and the Zero-frequency measures, but for brevity we report results the 
adjusted Amihud illiquidity measure.   
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(column 4). The result suggests that after we allow for the baseline hazard to be different for 
each household and each stock, the relationship between holding periods and transaction costs 
gets stronger 
In terms of economic significance, the hazard ratio of 0.973, estimated in column 4, would 
suggest that an increase in the adjusted Amihud ratio by one standard deviation would decrease 
the probability of a stock sale by a given household by 30%, indicating that the impact of 
illiquidity on the sale decision is economically highly significant.  Results in columns (1) 
through (4) of Table 3-Panel A would support the notion that the average investor understands 
the impact of liquidity on holding period and pays attention to transaction costs when making 
trading decisions.
16
 
In column (5) of Table 3-Panel A we control for stock characteristics such as size, book-to-
market and momentum, in addition to controlling for the adjusted Amihud illiquidity measure 
and household specific effects. The basic finding is unchanged as the loading on the adjusted 
Amihud illiquidity measure is less than one (0.981) and statistically significant. The estimated 
hazard ratio for momentum is statistically significant and larger than one (1.135), which 
indicates that investors are more likely to sell the recent winners, while retaining recent losers, 
consistent with the disposition effect. The estimated hazard ratios for size (0.649) and book-to-
market ratio (0.681) are both less than one and highly statistically significant, suggesting that US 
individual investors tend to hold large and value stocks for longer periods. 
                                                 
16
 In unreported results, we conduct a similar analysis using dummy variables for the most illiquid and most liquid 
stocks where the dummy variable takes on a value of one if the stock belongs to the most illiquid (liquid) decile 
among all stocks in a given year. We find that a stock in the highest illiquidity (liquidity) group is 40% (20%) less 
(more) likely to be sold compared to a stock not belonging to that group. 
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Next, we turn our attention to understanding how the relationship between transaction costs 
and the decision to hold versus sell a stock is impacted by trader characteristics. For this purpose, 
we extend the analysis in column (5) of Table 3-Panel A with additional controls for trader 
characteristics in column (6).
17
 Demographic related controls include investor age, Age; log of 
annual income in dollars, Log (Income); a dummy variable that is equal to one if the trader is 
married, Married Dummy; a gender dummy that is equal to one if the trader is male, Male 
Dummy; a dummy to capture if the trader holds a technical or managerial position, Professional 
Dummy; a dummy that takes on the value of one if the trading account is a retirement account, 
Retirement Acct Dummy; and a dummy that takes on the value of one if the trader is retired, 
Retired Dummy.  
In addition to basic demographic controls we also identify certain trader characteristics from 
each household’s trading history. In particular, we document the type of assets a household 
trades, as well as estimating the total dollar value and the concentration-level of each 
household’s portfolio. More specifically, we assign the value of one to the dummy variable, 
Foreign securities Dummy, if the household has ever traded foreign securities, one to the dummy 
variable, Option user Dummy, if the household has ever traded options, and one to the dummy 
variable, Short user Dummy, if the household has ever held a short position. We control for the 
total value invested by each household computed as the log of total equity investments, Log 
(Total Equity).  Finally, we control for the concentration of each household portfolio, 
Concentration, which is defined as in Ivkovic et al. (2008), and is equal to the sum of the squared 
values of the dollar weight of each stock in a household’s portfolio.  
                                                 
17
 These trader characteristics convey demographics related information particular to each household, including the 
financial sophistication level of a trader. 
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Column (6) of Table 3-Panel A reports the coefficient on adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio 
(AdjIlliq) after controlling for stock characteristics, demographics and trade level information. 
Unsurprisingly, the coefficient on (AdjIlliq) is less than one (0.983) and statistically highly 
significant. Our analysis in column (6) suggests that the basic relationship between transaction 
costs and holding periods is unchanged after controlling for additional household and trade 
characteristics.  In the next section, we investigate the interaction between transaction costs and 
these characteristics on the decision to sell versus hold a security.  
 
4.2 Impact of Investor Sophistication  
In this section we investigate how household and trade characteristics introduce 
heterogeneity in the relationship between transaction costs and holding periods of investors.  In 
particular, we provide empirical evidence in support of the first part of our second hypothesis 
(H2.a): The correlation between holding periods and transactions costs is higher for 
sophisticated investors.  
Following Goetzmann and Kumar (2008), we assume that financial sophistication is 
correlated with education and resources available to each investor. In particular, we assume that 
investors who have more income (Log (Income)), who work in technical and managerial 
positions (Professional Dummy), who invest larger amounts of capital in the stock market (Log 
(Total Equity)), and investors with experience trading options (Option user Dummy), foreign 
securities (Foreign securities Dummy), as well as those who have held a short equity position 
(Short user Dummy) are likely to be financially more sophisticated. Ivkovic, Sialm and 
Weisbenner (2008) propose and empirically document that investors who hold more 
concentrated portfolios are financially more sophisticated as they possess informational 
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advantages that allow them to outperform investors with diversified portfolios. We also assume 
that households with more concentrated portfolios (Concentration) are more likely to be 
financially sophisticated.  We examine the impact of sophistication by first creating a composite 
Sophistication measure and then interacting Sophistication with the AdjIlliq variable.  The 
computed sophistication measure ranges from a minimum value of 0 for the least sophisticated 
investor to a maximum value of 7 for the most sophisticated investor.
18
 
In column (6) of Panel A the coefficients on Foreign securities Dummy, Option user 
Dummy, Short user Dummy, Log (Total Equity) and Concentration are greater than one and 
statistically significant suggesting that most of the characteristics we associate with investor 
sophistication, except for Log (Income), are correlated with shorter holding periods.  Similar to 
results in Panel A we show in columns (1) and (2) of Panel B in Table 3 that investors with 
higher Sophistication scores on average have shorter holding periods as the hazard ratio 
coefficient on Sophistication is greater than one and highly statistically significant. While these 
results document that more sophisticated investors trade more frequently we turn our attention to 
the interaction of Sophistication with AdjIlliq to better understand if more sophisticated investors 
pay closer attention to transaction costs.  
We show in columns (1) and (2) in Panel B of Table 3 that those who are sophisticated tend 
to pay closer attention to the transaction costs as the coefficient on the interaction of the 
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 In the US transactions dataset the most financially sophisticated investor would have an income greater than 
$75,000 per year, would be in the top quartile in terms of total equity holdings, would trade options and foreign 
securities, would have held at least one short position over the sample period, would have a portfolio concentration 
greater than 0.35 and would work either in a technical or managerial role. The least financially sophisticated investor 
would have a score of zero in all seven attributes. 
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composite Sophistication score with AdjIlliq is statistically significant and less than one.
19
 More 
specifically the hazard ratio on AdjIlliq × Sophistication is 0.995 before controlling for 
household specific effects in column (1) and it becomes 0.994 in column (2) after using 
stratification to control for household specific factors. These results indicate that individuals who 
are more sophisticated have holding periods that are positively correlated with transaction costs, 
suggesting that sophisticated investors pay more attention to transaction costs than 
unsophisticated investors.
20
   
Figure 3 plots the hazard ratios of the variable AdjIlliq computed by running separate 
regressions for different groups of investors based on their level of sophistication indicated in the 
x-axis.  The regression model used is the same as model (1) in Panel B of Table 3.  The dotted 
lines show the 95th percentile confidence intervals of the estimated hazard ratios.  Group 0 
corresponds to investors with a Sophistication score of zero, while group 7 includes investors 
with a perfect Sophistication score of seven. The figure illustrates that as investor sophistication 
increases the hazard ratio on the adjusted Amihud illiquidity measure (AdjIlliq) monotonically 
decreases verifying that financially more sophisticated investors pay closer attention to 
transaction costs. 
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 The coefficients on the interactions of individual terms that constitute the Sophistication measure with AdjIlliq are 
not reported for brevity. The only interaction term that is marginally greater than one is AdjIlliq × Log (Income) 
which is statistically insignificant. All other interaction terms (AdjIlliq × Foreign securities Dummy, AdjIlliq × 
Option user Dummy, AdjIlliq × Short user Dummy, AdjIlliq × Professional Dummy, AdjIlliq × Log (Total Equity) 
and AdjIlliq × Concentration) are statistically significant and less than one. 
 
20
 In unreported results we repeat a similar analysis using two dummy variables: First, a dummy variable 
(Sophistication > 3 Dummy) that takes on the value of one if the Sophistication value for a given household is 
greater than three. Second, a dummy variable (AdjIlliq Dummy) that takes on the value of one if a stock is in the 
highest quintile ranked by the adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio over the previous 12 months prior to a transaction. 
Using these two dummy variables allows us to compare the trading behavior of the most financially sophisticated 
households with the rest of households. We find that an investor with a Sophistication score greater than three is 
30% less likely to sell a highly illiquid equity at a given point in time, compared to an investor whose Sophistication 
score is three or less. 
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Results in section 4 empirically verify our first (H1) and second (H2.a) hypotheses and hence 
confirm Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) predictions. In particular, we show that households 
choose to hold stocks with higher transaction costs for longer durations and that financially more 
sophisticated investors pay closer attention to the impact of transaction costs when deciding to 
hold versus sell a stock.
21
 
 
5. Attention to Transaction Costs and Trading Ability 
In this section, we study the implications of liquidity decisions of individual investors on 
their investment performance. We showed in section 4 that there are cross-sectional differences 
in the correlation between holding periods and transaction costs across households. As 
hypothesized in section 2, this correlation may also impact the portfolio performance of 
households. In particular, a negative correlation between holding periods and transaction costs 
could indicate low levels of financial sophistication and market knowledge, resulting in lower 
returns. 
To identify households who pay more attention to transaction costs, we use the same hazard 
model as before, but now instead of pooling across all households, we estimate the coefficient on 
the transaction costs variable (AdjIlliq) for each household individually. We then use the 
correlation between holding periods and transaction costs as a proxy for how much attention 
each investor pays to transaction costs. In order to obtain robust estimates, we require that 
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 These findings are also in line with the predictions of dynamic models that endogenize the holding period decision 
(Constantinides (1986), Vayanos (1998), Vayanos and Vila (1999), Heaton and Lucas (1996), Huang (2003), Lynch 
and Tan (2011), Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2004)).  
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households make at least 50 round-trip trades over the sample period.
22
  This leaves us with a 
sample of 2,192 households.  For the majority of households in the dataset (over 60%), holding 
periods are positively correlated with transaction costs, as the corresponding hazard ratio for the 
transaction costs variable, AdjIlliq, is less than one for these observations. This finding suggests 
that most individual investors in our dataset pay attention to transaction costs, as they hold 
illiquid securities in their portfolio for longer periods than they hold liquid securities.  
 We categorize households into two groups based on the magnitude of the hazard ratio on the 
transaction costs variable (AdjIlliq).  In particular, we classify investors as paying attention to 
transaction costs if the hazard ratio is less than one (Group 1 in Table 4) and not paying attention 
to transaction costs if the hazard ratio is greater than one (Group 2 in Table 4). We then compute 
1, 6 and 12 month returns for each stock from the date of purchase.
23
  We also compute, 1, 6 and 
12 month characteristics-adjusted returns as in Daniel et al. (1997) in order to make sure that the 
differences in the returns between these two investor groups are not driven by differences in 
stock characteristics. These returns are reported in Table 4.  We report two sets of results.  In 
Panel A, we report returns only for households for whom we are able to compute the hazard ratio 
on the Amihud illiquidity measure -AdjIlliq -with a minimum significance level of 10%.  In 
Panel B, we report results for all households regardless of the significance level of the hazard 
ratio.   
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 We obtain similar results using 20 or 30 trades instead of 50 trades. 
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 This is following by Seru, Shumway and Stoffman (2010) and others.  Using realized returns based on closed 
trades is problematic and can introduce biases.  For instance, if the disposition effect is strong, only profitable trades 
would be closed.   
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We calculate 1, 6 and 12 month raw and characteristics-adjusted returns from the day of 
purchase for all transactions executed by these investors in order to assess their investment 
ability.  There is a stark difference in the investment performance of these two groups.  
Households who pay attention to transaction costs earn 0.1%, 1.3%, and 2.9% more in raw 
returns and 0.1%, 1.0%, and 2.5% more in characteristics-adjusted excess returns over 1-month, 
6-month and 12-month holding periods respectively.  The returns reported for all households in 
Panel B are similar in magnitude.   
Table 4 also reports the average holding period and the realized spread for the two groups of 
investors.  Spread is the ex-post realized bid-ask spread paid by the investors for each transaction 
in the dataset.  The calculation is the same as in Barber and Odean (2000), and is calculated as 
the transaction price divided by the CRSP closing price minus one.  This value is multiplied by 
minus one for purchases.  The round trip spread that is reported is computed as the sum of sale 
and purchase spreads. The difference in spreads between the two groups of households is 2.8%, 
which is economically and statistically significant.  This result indicates that investors who do 
not pay attention to transaction costs pay significantly higher transaction costs as a result.   This 
in turn suggests that the differences between the two groups’ net returns after adjusting for 
transaction costs would be even higher.   
Overall, the findings in this section provide evidence in favor of our hypothesis H2.b. 
Investors who pay attention to transaction costs have on average better performance even before 
accounting for transaction costs, consistent with these investors being more sophisticated. 
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6. Robustness Tests 
In this section, we conduct two robustness tests around our main findings. The first 
robustness test aims to address a potential omitted-variables problem. It is possible that stock 
liquidity is related to a certain unobserved variable that in turn affects investors’ decision to sell 
versus hold.  In order to address this potential endogeneity problem, we study investor behavior 
around periods of quasi-exogenous liquidity shocks that are unlikely to affect holding periods 
directly.  Specifically, in section 6.1 we examine how stock liquidity and holding periods change 
around stock split events.  
The second robustness test is meant to address potential selection issues with the US sample.  
Transaction-level dataset used in the US captures only a fraction of the US households’ trades 
during certain years and hence may be insufficient to test our main predictions.  In order to 
address this criticism, we repeat our main analyses in section 6.2 utilizing another dataset which 
covers all Finnish individual investors’ complete trading records. Using an additional dataset 
from another country also provides us with an “out-of-sample” test of our main findings.   
 
6.1 Quasi-exogenous shocks to liquidity 
As we have mentioned earlier, a long line of literature documents a significant reduction in 
transaction costs and improved liquidity subsequent to stock splits (Schultz 2000, Desai, 
Nimalendran, and Venkataraman 1998, Kryzanowski and Zhang 1996, Conroy, Harris, and 
Benet 1990).  These studies also show that post-split performance of splitting firms is 
statistically indistinguishable from that of non-splitting firms with similar characteristics (see for 
instance, Byun and Rozeff 2003), implying that stock splits do not credibly signal improved 
performance. This suggests that one plausible motivation for why investors decide to trade 
28 
 
splitting stocks more is the reduction in transaction costs subsequent to split events. Thus, we use 
stock split events as quasi-exogenous shocks to liquidity and investigate investors’ trading 
decisions around stock splits to address the potential omitted-variables problem.  
We first empirically establish that stock splits indeed lead to an increase in liquidity and a 
reduction in transaction costs. For this purpose, we utilize close to two thousand stock split 
events that took place in the US between 1991 and 1996, and document that transaction costs 
decrease by about ten percent for the median stock following stock splits.  If investors hold 
illiquid securities for longer periods as predicted by Amihud and Mendelson (1986), then the 
reduction in transaction costs subsequent to stock splits should lead to shorter average holding 
periods, increasing the likelihood of selling the splitting stock. We empirically test this 
prediction, and show that the average splitting stock is 18% more likely to be sold subsequent to 
a stock-split.  
We identify a total of 3,586 stock splits between 1991 and 1996 in our sample. We exclude 
1,067 observations that have a cash-dividend distribution within a [-30, +30] days window 
around the stock split event to make sure that our results are not contaminated by the influence of 
other types of shareholder distributions. Following the prior literature on stock splits, we further 
remove reverse splits and forward splits, and splits that have a split factor of less than 0.25.  Our 
final sample includes 1,850 pure forward split events with available data.  
First, we verify that our measures of transaction costs decline subsequent to a split.  We 
regress the adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio (AdjIlliq) on a time period indicator, After Split 
dummy, which equals one for the time periods of six-month (+6 months), nine-month (+9 
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months) and twelve-month (+12 months) subsequent to the split event, and zero otherwise.
24
  
Table 5 presents the results. We find that transaction costs, proxied by the adjusted Amihud 
Illiquidity ratio, decrease subsequent to stock splits.  The coefficient on the After Split dummy is 
negative and statistically significant. For example in column (2), we observe that the coefficient 
on the After Split dummy is -0.186, controlling for stock characteristics. Considering that the 
median US stock has an adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio of 1.66, the estimated -0.186 
coefficient on the After Split dummy suggests transaction costs decrease by about 10% for the 
median stock after a split.  Thus, we conclude that for the firms in our dataset the impact of stock 
splits on transaction costs is economically significant over the sample period. 
Having established that stock splits lead to lower transaction costs, we next investigate if 
households reduce their holding periods subsequent to stock splits. In particular, we investigate 
the marginal impact of a split event on the likelihood of a stock being sold. In doing so, we study 
individuals’ trading behavior over 6, 9 and 12-month periods subsequent to the ex-split dates 
using a dynamic hazard regression framework. In the dynamic hazard regression framework, the 
dependent variable is the duration until a transaction is closed, i.e. until a share bought earlier is 
sold. Following Christakis and Allison (2006), we create a time-varying dummy variable set to 
one during the time period 6, 9, 12 months after a split and zero otherwise.  As before, if a sale is 
not observed, i.e. in case the investors hold their positions until the end of the sample period 
without selling it, we treat these observations as censored.   
                                                 
24
 We also analyze two-month and three-month windows, and don’t observe significant changes in stock liquidity. 
According to Lakonishok and Lev (1987), trading volume starts to increase from 7 months prior to the time a stock 
splits and then declines within 2 months subsequent to the split event. The pattern observed by Lakonishok and Lev 
(1987) might explain the insignificant results when we use two or three month windows.  
30 
 
To construct the appropriate dataset for the dynamic hazard framework, we split the duration 
period of the transaction into multiple parts. The first part covers the time period from the 
purchase of the share until the split event. In this first period we assign a value of zero to the 
After Split dummy. The second part is for the time period from the split until the end of the 
window of interest. This window varies from 6-months to 12-months for the different models we 
study. For the second period, After Split dummy takes on a value of one. The third part 
corresponds to the period subsequent to the after split window. For this time period the After 
Split dummy takes on a value of zero.
25
   Since it’s possible for transactions to be open even after 
6, 9, 12 months after a split, this setup ensures that After Split dummy will only equal one when 
a sale event falls within the event window, and as time elapses to the post-event window period, 
the After Split dummy will switch back to 0. The After Split dummy switches back to zero 
subsequent to the window of interest as the impact of splits on transaction costs and holding 
period decisions is not expected to be permanent. In this analysis the After Split dummy captures 
the marginal impact of stock splits on sale decisions over a distinct event horizon. Given the 
reduction in transaction costs subsequent to stock splits, we would expect to find a hazard ratio 
greater than one on the After Split dummy as households would be more likely to reduce their 
holding periods subsequent to the split event. 
Table 6 reports the estimated results of the dynamic hazard regression. In all models in Table 
6 we control for calendar year and month specific effects, and in models (2), (4), and (6) we 
further control for stock characteristics - size, book-to-market and momentum.  As before, we 
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 In the rare instances where there are multiple splits before a transaction is closed, we split the transaction duration 
into more parts setting the After Split dummy equal to one during the 6,9,12 month time period after the second 
split.   
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calculate all stock characteristics when the transaction is closed.
26
 In all specifications, we find 
that the estimated hazard ratio for the After Split dummy is larger than one and statistically 
significant at the one percent level.  For example, results in column (2) show that with stock and 
calendar time controls, the estimated hazard ratio is 1.183 for the After Split dummy, indicating 
that investors are 18% more likely to sell a stock in the initial six months subsequent to its split. 
The reduction in average holding period subsequent to a stock split is equivalent to 37 trading 
days, or nearly two months. We should note that the baseline hazard rate captures the increasing 
probability of a sale as time passes.  After Split dummy, therefore, captures the marginal impact 
of being in post-split time period on the probability of a sale, and does not simply capture a 
mechanical relationship due to the fact that probability of a sale increases as time passes on.  Our 
results document that individual investors reduce their average holding periods significantly 
subsequent to stock splits. Considering that the median holding period for our sample is 185 
days, the reduction in average household holding period is economically significant.   
Our results are also robust to controlling for different event horizons. In particular, we find 
that the After Split dummy coefficient takes on a statistically significant value of 1.192 for the 
nine-month window analysis, and 1.198 for the twelve-month window analysis after controlling 
for stock characteristics. Overall, our results confirm that subsequent to stock splits transaction 
costs decline and individual investors respond by selling their holdings in splitting stocks. 
 
 
                                                 
26
 The methodology used for the dynamic hazard regression naturally increases the number of observations. If there 
is a single split event for a stock this event will lead to the creation of two additional lines for each account affected 
by the split, tripling the data. As a result of this there are 943,137 observations in Table 6, which is significantly 
larger than the number of observations in Table 3. 
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6.2 Out of Sample Test: Transaction Level Analyses in Finland 
In this section, we provide further robustness analysis in support of our main findings, using 
transaction-level data from Finland. The transaction-level dataset from Finland covers individual 
investors’ complete trading records. There are approximately two million transactions 
attributable to 303,235 households over the 1995 to 2003 for which we have complete 
information for our regression analyses. Similar to the U.S. dataset, the Finnish dataset reports 
for each transaction, the number of shares traded and the daily closing price. Furthermore, we 
observe the initial holdings for each account at the beginning of the dataset, allowing us to keep 
track of the total holdings of all households on a daily basis. There is also additional information 
regarding individuals’ demographic information, such as age and gender. Unlike in the US, we 
do not have information about income, occupation, and marital status. We obtain stock and firm 
characteristics from Datastream. 
Table 7 reports summary statistics for stock and investor characteristics for Finland. Only 
stocks that are traded by households in the dataset are considered. Summary statistics are 
calculated by pooling observations over the 1995-2003 time period. All liquidity measures are 
annual averages as defined earlier in the text. The results show that our major illiquidity measure 
– adjusted Amihud ratio (AdjIlliq) - is positively skewed with a mean of 10.61, but a much 
smaller median of 6.21. The distributions of other illiquidity measures are similarly positively 
skewed. Roll’s C has a mean (median) of 2.96 (2.30) and Zerofreq has a mean (median) of 
21.90% (20.64%). Size is also positively skewed, with the average market capitalization 
approximately 11 times as large as the median firm size.  
The mean (median) household portfolio value is 10,823 (2,079) Euros in Finland. 4% of 
households trade options, while 33% of the primary account holders are female. Less than one 
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percent of the households in Finland have ever held a short position during the 1995-2003 time 
period.
27
 Mean portfolio concentration is 0.20, roughly corresponding to holding five stocks with 
equal value weights of 20%.  
We use a framework similar to the one we utilize in the US, in order to test the validity of 
hypotheses (1) and (2.a) for Finnish investors. We run a hazard model estimating the conditional 
probability that a stock is sold controlling for stock illiquidity, firm characteristics, investors’ 
demographic information as well as investor sophistication. Consistent with our US analysis and 
following standard reporting convention, we report hazard ratios instead of estimated 
coefficients. 
Panel A of Table 8 reports results for the hazard model run on the transaction-level Finnish 
dataset. Results are remarkably similar to the US. Hazard ratio coefficient on the adjusted 
Amihud illiquidity measure (AdjIlliq) in column (1) is less than one (0.984) and statistically 
significant. Using either Roll’s C (in column 2) or Zerofreq (in column 3) instead of AdjIIliq 
yields similar results. Our basic analysis suggests that the average investor in Finland holds 
stocks with higher transaction costs for a longer period of time, consistent with our findings in 
the United States and as predicted by Amihud and Mendelson (1986). When we control for 
household and firm specific effects using stratification in column (4) we find that the hazard ratio 
coefficient on the adjusted Amihud illiquidity measure (AdjIlliq) is still less than one (0.976) and 
statistically significant.  
Similarly, further controlling for stock characteristics in addition to household specific 
effects in column (5) also yields a hazard ratio coefficient on the adjusted Amihud illiquidity 
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 This is not entirely surprising since Bris, Goetzman, and Zhu (2007) suggest that short selling became legal in 
Finland in 1998 but that tax laws inhibit would be short sellers. 
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measure (AdjIlliq) that is less than one (0.982) and statistically significant. In column (6) we 
control for household and stock characteristics together and once again find a hazard ratio of 
0.982 on the adjusted Amihud illiquidity measure. This hazard ratio would suggest that the 
average investor is 20% less likely to sell a stock she or he holds when the stock’s illiquidity 
measure increases by one standard deviation, suggesting that households in Finland are 
cognizant of transaction costs and pay attention to liquidity when trading. The economic 
significance of the estimated hazard ratio of AdjIIliq for Finnish stocks is similar to that for the 
US stocks. 
We further investigate how household characteristics introduce heterogeneity in the 
relationship between transaction costs and holding period. In particular, we examine if 
financially more sophisticated investors pay more attention to transaction costs. In doing so, we 
control for the effects of demographic characteristics available in the Finnish dataset such as age 
and gender. As in the US analysis, we assume that financial sophistication is correlated with 
education and resources available to each investor. Investors who invest larger amounts of 
capital in the stock market – higher Log (Equity Holding)-, households with experience trading 
options – one for Option user Dummy- or that have higher portfolio concentration 
(Concentration) are assumed to be financially more sophisticated. Since a very small percentage 
of Finnish households have ever held short positions, we do not include this criteria in the 
construction of our Sophistication measure. Since the Finland transaction data doesn’t provide 
information regarding investors’ income and professions, or information about whether the 
investor has ever traded any foreign securities, we exclude these criteria in the construction of 
the Finnish sophistication measure.  
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Our sophistication measure for Finland ranges from a minimum of zero (0) for the least 
sophisticated investors to a maximum of three (3) for the most sophisticated investors. Column 
(1) of Panel B in Table 8 reports that the hazard ratio of the Amihud illiquidity measure 
interacted with the overall sophistication measure, AdjIlliq×Sophistication, is statistically 
significant and less than one (0.996).  This result suggests that Finnish investors who are more 
financially sophisticated on average pay greater attention to transaction costs, and as such hold 
illiquid stocks for a longer period of time than less sophisticated investors do. In Column (2), we 
control for household specific effects using stratification and find consistent results. 
In order to better interpret the economic significance of the results shown in Table 8, we 
assign each stock into liquidity deciles based on the adjusted Amihud ratio. We construct a 
dummy variable and assign a value of one to the decile with the most illiquid securities. In 
unreported results we repeat the analyses in Panel A of Table 8 using decile values of the 
adjusted Amihud ratio and find that a stock in the highest illiquidity group in Finland is 40% less 
likely to be sold compared to a more liquid stock with similar firm and investor characteristics, 
which is comparable to the findings in the US.  
These results serve as an out-of-sample test for our main findings in the US, verifying that 
our findings are not confined to one market and are not unique to one specific time period. More 
importantly, since the dataset from Finland includes the complete transactions of all Finnish 
households between 1995 and 2003, our findings are generalizable to the full cross-section of 
households in Finland. 
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7. Conclusions 
This paper investigates how the trading decisions of 66,000 (303,000) households in the US 
(Finland) are influenced by transaction costs. It provides a direct link between investors’ holding 
periods and transaction costs and empirically verifies Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) theory of 
liquidity clienteles. Three main conclusions follow from our analysis. First, we show that 
transaction costs are an important determinant of investment decisions of individual investors. 
Consistent with theoretical models of investor behavior, households rationally reduce the 
frequency with which they trade illiquid securities subject to high transaction costs. This finding 
is robust to controlling for household and stock characteristics.  
Second, we show that there is cross-sectional variation in the relationship between holding 
periods and transaction costs across households. Particularly, we find that the relationship 
between transaction costs and holding periods is stronger among more sophisticated investors. 
Third, we show that paying attention to transaction costs has important implications for 
investment performance. Households whose holding periods are negatively related to transaction 
costs earn lower gross returns even before adjusting for transaction costs when compared to 
households whose holding periods are positively related to transaction costs, suggesting that 
those investors who pay closer attention to transaction costs have better trading ability. 
 Finally, to address endogeneity and selection concerns, we study how investors’ holding 
periods change around quasi-exogenous changes in transaction costs, and we extend our analyses 
to a sample of investors from Finland.  We show that our main findings are robust to potential 
endogeneity and selection concerns. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Stock and Investor Characteristics in the US  
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for stock and investor characteristics in the US, where only stocks that have 
observed individual investor transactions in the dataset are considered. Summary statistics are calculated by pooling 
annual observations over the 1991-1996 time period. We report the mean, standard deviations (Std.Dev), as well as 
median, the 25
th
 (P25) and 75
th
 (P75) percentile values for all variables used in the study. All liquidity measures are 
annual averages as defined in the text. Price is the annual average of daily closing prices. Mkt Cap is the average market 
capitalization in millions of US dollars. B/M is the book-to-market ratio. Past Returns (-12, -2) is a proxy for momentum 
and measures cumulative returns during the past 10 month starting at month -12 and ending two months prior.  AdjIlliq 
is the adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio. Roll’s C is the Bayesian estimate of Roll’s (1984) transactions cost measure. 
Zerofreq is zero-return frequency which reports the percentage of zero-return days. Age in 1996 is the biological age of 
the investor in 1996. Married is a dummy variable that equals one for married traders. Gender is a dummy variable that 
equals one if head of the household is a female. Professional occupation is a dummy variable and is equal to one for 
traders that hold either technical or managerial positions.  Retired is a dummy variable that is equal to one for traders 
who already retired. Retired Account is a dummy variable that equals one if the transaction takes place in a retirement 
account such as a 401(k). Portfolio concentration is defined as in Ivkovic, Sialm and Weisbenner (2008) and is calculated 
as the sum of squared value weights of each stock in a household’s portfolio. Equity Portfolio Value reports the total 
dollar value of a household’s equity portfolio. Income is annual self-reported income in thousands of dollars. Trades 
Option is a dummy variable that equals one if a trader has traded options at least once over the entire sample period. 
Trades Foreign Securities is a dummy variable that equals one if a trader has traded non-US securities at least once over 
the entire sample period. Short Position is a dummy variable that equals one if an investor has shorted any security at 
least once over the entire sample period. 
 
 
Mean P25 Median P75 Std. Dev 
 
Stock Characteristics  
Price ($) 22.56 7.25 15.75 28.25 139.95 
Mkt Cap ($mil) 1,804.96 70.83 241.32 1058.16 6000 
B/M 0.69 0.20 0.41 0.77 1.40 
Past Returns (-12, -2) 0.34 -0.12 0.16 0.52 0.92 
AdjIlliq 3.30 0.28 0.46 2.04 6.570 
Roll's C 1.73 0.45 1.06 2.26 2.05 
Zerofreq 4.82% 0.00% 2.70% 8.33% 7.85% 
 
Investor Characteristics  
Age in 1996 49.58 40 48 58 12.40 
Married (1=married) 0.76 1 1 1 0.43 
Gender (1=female) 0.10 0 0 0 0.30 
Professional occupation 0.66 0 1 1 0.47 
Retired 0.15 0 0 0 0.36 
Retired Account 0.39 0 0 1 0.49 
Portfolio Concentration 0.52 0.28 0.48 0.73 0.28 
Equity Portfolio Value, USD 80,342 8,900 22,952 62,087 313,568 
Income, USD 76,840 45,000 87,500 112,500 33,190 
Trades Option 0.14 0 0 0 0.34 
Trades Foreign Securities 0.22 0 0 0 0.42 
Short Position 0.38 0 0 1 0.49 
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Table 2: Impact of Transaction Costs on Households’ Holding Periods in the US, univariate analysis 
Table 2 presents univariate analysis of the relationship between stock illiquidity and the holding period for each transaction in the 
US between 1991 and 1996. Holding Period is the number of trading days elapsed between the purchase and the first sale of that 
asset by a specific investor. Holding period for censored transactions, i.e. when sales of the assets are not observed, are estimated 
assuming the asset is sold on the last available date in the dataset. All transactions are ranked into ten portfolios based on their 
holding periods accordingly. Averages for the various liquidity measures for the underlying securities are then calculated for each 
group. All illiquidity measures are annual averages and are defined in the text. Price is the annual average of daily closing prices. 
Mkt Cap is the average market capitalization in millions of dollars. AdjIlliq is the adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio. Roll’s C is 
the Bayesian estimate of the Roll’s (1984) transaction cost measure. Zerofreq is zero return frequency which measures the 
proportion of zero-return days per year. By definition, as the values of AdjIlliq, Roll’s C and Zerofreq increase, liquidity 
decreases. High minus Low reports the differences for each variable between transactions groups with the longest and shortest 
holding-periods. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
  
Holding 
Period 
Price 
$ 
Mkt Cap 
(Millions) AdjIlliq Roll's C 
Zerofreq 
(%) 
Low 6 33.46 7,283 0.9172 0.6608 2.52 
2 20 31.36 6,880 0.9865 0.6834 2.72 
3 44 30.25 7,153 1.0592 0.7054 2.84 
4 79 30.16 8,410 1.0828 0.7072 2.85 
5 127 33.46 8,601 1.2310 0.7337 3.06 
6 194 30.29 9,547 1.2279 0.7312 3.03 
7 294 30.51 9,814 1.3938 0.7382 3.09 
8 470 28.50 9,712 1.5231 0.7312 3.14 
9 771 30.49 11,508 1.6347 0.7425 3.40 
High 1225 34.37 9,686 1.8397 0.8182 3.83 
High-Low 1219*** 0.91 2,403*** 0.9224*** 0.1575*** 1.32*** 
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Table 3: Impact of Transaction Costs on Households’ Holding Periods in the US, hazard analysis 
Table 3 examines the impact of transaction costs on individual investors’ holding periods in the US using a hazard model 
framework. Panel A reports the estimated hazard ratios from the hazard regressions for US households between 1991 and 
1996, where the conditional probability of sale is the dependent variable. Independent variables include the adjusted Amihud 
illiquidity ratio; firm characteristics; a set of demographic controls; trade variables; as well as the interactions of transactions 
costs measures with investor characteristics. Proxies for transactions costs (AdjIlliq, as well as Roll’s C and Zerofreq) are 
calculated averages over the previous 12 months before each sale transaction. Size is the market value of equity. B/M or book-
to-market ratio is computed as the ratio of previous year-end book value to the most recent market capitalization.  Momentum 
is the cumulative returns over the ten-month period between month -12 to month -2. Stock characteristics are calculated at the 
beginning of the month when a sale takes place. Age refers to the age of the head of the household. Income is the total self-
reported annual income. Married Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the investor is married. Male Dummy is equal 
to one if the head of the household is a male. Professional Dummy is one for investors who hold technical or managerial 
positions, and Retired Dummy is equal to one for investors who already retired. Retirement Acct Dummy equals one if the 
underlying account is a retirement (IRA or Keogh) account. Trade variables for each individual investor are derived from all 
the transactions he/she executes during the sample period. Short User Dummy equals one if an investor executed at least one 
short sale during the sample period. Option User Dummy is one if an investor ever traded options. Foreign Securities Dummy 
is set to one if an investor traded at least once any foreign assets, including ADRs, foreign stocks or foreign mutual funds 
during the sample period. Portfolio concentration is defined as in Ivkovic, Sialm and Weisbenner (2008) and is equal to the 
sum of squared value weights of each stock in a household’s portfolio. Panel B investigates if investor sophistication affects 
investors’ attention to transaction costs. Investor sophistication is presumed to cumulatively increase with each of the 
following criteria met: if the investor has an income higher than $75K; if the investor is ranked among the top 25% of all 
investors based on equity holdings at any point in time during the sample period; if the investor holds either technical or 
managerial positions and as such is considered a professional; if the investor traded options at least once during the entire 
sample period; if the investor has ever held any short positions during the sample period; if the investor has ever traded foreign 
securities, including ADRs, foreign stocks or mutual funds; and if the investor’s portfolio is more concentrated than the 
median investor’s, i.e. if the investor’s portfolio concentration is greater than 0.48. The most sophisticated investors in the US 
have a Sophistication score of seven (7), while the least sophisticated have a Sophistication score of zero (0). Calendar month 
dummies (not reported) are twelve dummy variables that equals one if the sale transaction happens during the specific month. 
Year dummies (not reported) equal one for the year during which a transaction happens. Clustered robust standard errors are 
calculated at the household level. Ties are handled using the Efron procedure. Wald test is used for each additional set of 
regressors. P-values are reported below each coefficient. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are denoted by 
*, **, and ***, respectively. 
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       Panel A: Hazard Regressions, Impact of Transaction Costs on Individual Traders’ Holding Period Decisions in US 
  
  
  
  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
AdjIlliq Roll's C Zerofreq AdjIlliq AdjIlliq AdjIlliq 
Illiquidity measure 0.981
***
 0.982
***
 0.322
***
 0.973
***
 0.981
***
 0.983
***
 
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Stock characteristics 
Size 
    
0.649
***
 0.724
***
 
     
<.0001 <.0001 
B/M 
    
0.681
***
 0.889
***
 
     
<.0001 <.0001 
Momentum 
    
1.135
***
 1.113
***
 
     
<.0001 <.0001 
Demographic variables 
Age 
     
0.997
***
 
      
<.0001 
Log (Income)  
     
0.927
***
 
      
<.0001 
Married Dummy 
     
0.959
***
 
      
<.0001 
Male Dummy 
     
1.103
***
 
      
<.0001 
Professional Dummy 
     
1.001 
      
0.891 
Retirement Acct Dummy 
     
0.912
***
 
      
<.0001 
Retired Dummy 
     
1.076
***
 
  
 
 
    
<.0001 
 
 
 
 
Trade variables 
Foreign securities Dummy 
     
1.245
***
 
      
<.0001 
Option User Dummy 
     
1.395
***
 
      
<.0001 
Short User Dummy 
     
1.877
***
 
      
<.0001 
Log (Total Equity)  
     
1.079
***
 
      
<.0001 
Concentration 
     
3.228
***
 
      
<.0001 
Firm stratification No No No Yes No No 
Household stratification No No No Yes Yes No 
Calendar month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Calendar year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 799,469 799,469 766,168 799,469 589,794 156,350 
Wald test <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
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Panel B: Hazard Regressions, Impact of Sophistication on Attention to Transaction Costs in US 
  (1) (2) 
AdjIlliq 0.988** 0.984** 
  0.020 0.011 
Age 0.993*** 0.994*** 
  <.0001 <.0001 
Married Dummy 0.879*** 0.873*** 
  <.0001 <.0001 
Male Dummy 1.046*** 1.045*** 
  0.001 0.005 
Retirement Acct Dummy 0.840*** 0.862*** 
  <.0001 <.0001 
Retired Dummy 1.379*** 1.401*** 
  <.0001 <.0001 
AdjIlliq × Age  1.000*** 1.000*** 
  <.0001 <.0001 
AdjIlliq × Married Dummy 1.003* 1.006*** 
  0.053 0.010 
AdjIlliq × Male Dummy 0.993** 0.992** 
  0.021 0.043 
AdjIlliq × Retirement Acct Dummy 0.999 0.997 
  0.441 0.251 
AdjIlliq × Retired Dummy 0.990*** 0.988*** 
  <.0001 <.0001 
Sophistication 1.265*** 1.272*** 
  <.0001 <.0001 
AdjIlliq × Sophistication 0.995*** 0.994*** 
  <.0001 <.0001 
Stock Controls Yes Yes 
Household stratification No Yes 
Calendar month dummies Yes Yes 
Calendar year dummies Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 156,350 156,350 
Wald test <.0001 <.0001 
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Table 4: Attention to Transaction Costs and Trading Ability 
Table 4 reports returns for two groups of households. The two groups are formed based on the magnitude of their hazard ratios 
for the transaction cost variables, which are estimated from US household level hazard regressions described in Section 5. 
Hazard ratio on adjusted Amihud’s illiquidity ratio, AdjIlliq, is used as a proxy for how much attention the individual pays to 
transaction costs. To get robust estimates, households are required to have made at least 50 trades during the sample period to 
be included in the analysis. 1-, 6-, and 12-month returns are calculated starting from the date of purchase. Characteristics 
adjusted returns are calculated as returns net of characteristics matched portfolios, as in Daniel et al. (1997). Spread is 
estimated as in Barber and Odean (2000) and is equal to trading price divided by the CRSP closing price minus one for sales.  
The ratio is multiplied by minus one for purchases. Round trip spread is the sum of sale and purchase spreads and is reported 
below..  Transactions with a purchase or sale price less than $2, and holding periods less than 2 days, are excluded from the 
sample. Panel A reports returns for the two groups where the hazard ratio of the transaction cost variable, AdjIlliq, is estimated 
with a minimum significance level of 10%. Panel B reports returns for the full sample. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Panel A: Observations with AdjIlliq Hazard Ratio at >10% Significance  
 Group 1 
Pays Attention to 
Transaction Costs  
Group 2 
Doesn't Pay Attention  
to Transaction Costs 
 
Group 1  - Group 2 
1 Month return   0.018  0.018   0.001 
1 Month return Char. adj.  -0.001 -0.001   0.001 
6 Month return   0.079  0.066   0.013
***
 
6 Month return Char. adj.  -0.001 -0.002   0.010
***
 
12 Month return   0.161   0.132   0.029
***
 
12 Month return Char. adj.  -0.010 -0.035   0.025
***
 
Spread (%)  0.675  3.457  -2.782
***
 
Holding Period (days)  100.0  156.9  -56.9
***
 
     
     
     
Panel B: All Observations    
 Group 1 
Pays Attention to 
Transaction Costs  
Group 2 
Doesn't Pay Attention  
to Transaction Costs 
 
Group 1  - Group 2 
1 Month return   0.018  0.017   0.001
**
 
1 Month return Char. adj.  -0.001 -0.002   0.002
**
 
6 Month return   0.079  0.070   0.009
***
 
6 Month return Char. adj.  -0.010 -0.019   0.009
***
 
12 Month return   0.162  0.146   0.016
***
 
12 Month return Char. adj.  -0.009 -0.027   0.018
***
 
Spread (%)  1.093  3.321  -2.228
***
 
Holding Period (days)  115.6  147.4  -31.8
***
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Table 5: Change in Illiquidity around Stock Splits 
Table 5 reports the changes in illiquidity for stocks that split in the US around their ex-split dates. There are 1,850 forward 
stock splits during our sample period with a split factor larger than or equal to 0.25. An OLS regression of stock illiquidity on 
a time period indicator – After Split-dummy is estimated, controlling for size, book-to-market and momentum. The dependent 
variable is the monthly adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio. The comparison of illiquidity involves different event windows, 
namely 6 months, 9 months and 12 months after stock splits. The time period indicator – After Split-dummy equals to one for 
observations of splitting stocks within the specified event window subsequent to their splits, otherwise it is zero. Each 
coefficient reported below for the –After Split-dummy comes from a single OLS regression. Size, book-to-market and 
momentum are also calculated monthly. For brevity, the coefficients for size, book-to-market and momentum are not reported. 
For each event window, we first report OLS results without firm controls and followed by results with firm controls in the 
adjacent columns. Standard errors are below each estimated coefficients. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
 Window 6-months 9-months 12-months 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
After Split 
dummy 
-0.193
***
 -0.186
***
 -0.250
***
 -0.248
***
 -0.293
***
 -0.289
***
 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) 
       
Stock Controls 
 
No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 31,652 27,703 47,271 40,488 62,744 52,484 
Adj. R2 0.005 0.044 0.008 0.046 0.011 0.048 
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Table 6: Impact of US Stock Splits on Holding Period Decisions 
Table 6 examines the impact of stock splits on individual investors’ holding period decisions. It reports the estimated hazard ratios 
from dynamic hazard regressions in the US where the conditional probability of sale is the dependent variable. Holding period is 
calculated as previously defined. For each stock-holding position, there is one observation for each day t the position is open, up to 
and including the day the stock is sold, or in cases where sales of stocks are not observed, until the last day of the dataset. The 
dependent variable, which is sale conditional on holding until day t is 1 if the stock is sold on this particular day, otherwise it is zero. 
We define three different event windows, which range from 6 months to 12 months. The After Split dummy is equal to1 if the stock 
experienced a split within 6 months (or other time horizon, i.e. 9 months, or 12 months) prior to day t, otherwise it is equal to0. The 
table reports the estimated hazard ratios on the – After Split- dummy. In all specifications, we control for time specific effects with 
calendar year and month dummies. We also control for size, book-to-market and momentum in models (2), (4) and (6). Firm 
characteristics are measured at the beginning of the month during which the sales are observed while year and month dummies equal 
to one when a sale takes place. For brevity, estimated hazard ratios for firm characteristics and calendar year and month dummies are 
not reported. P-values are included below each coefficient. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, 
and ***, respectively. 
 
Impact of Stock Splits on Holding Period Decisions 
Window 6-months 9-months 12-months 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
After Split dummy 1.344
***
 1.183
**
 1.328
***
 1.192
***
 1.310
***
 1.198
***
 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0001 
Stock controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Calendar month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Calendar year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 943,137 702,494 943,727 704,085 947,485 706,846 
Wald test <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
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Table 7: Summary Statistics of Stock and Investor Characteristics in Finland 
Table 7 reports descriptive statistics for stock and investor characteristics in Finland. Summary statistics are calculated by pooling 
annual observations over the 1996-2003 time period. We report the mean, standard deviation, as well as median, the 25
th
 and 75
th
 
percentile values for all variables used in the study. All liquidity measures are annual averages and are defined in the text. Price is the 
annual average of the daily closing prices. Mkt Cap is the average market capitalization in millions of Euros. AdjIlliq is the adjusted 
Amihud illiquidity ratio. Roll’s C is the Bayesian estimate of Roll’s (1984) transactions cost measure. Zerofreq is zero-return 
frequency which reports the percentage of zero-return days. Age in 1995 is the biological age of the investor in 1995. Gender 
(1=female) is a dummy variable that equals one for female traders. Portfolio concentration is defined as in Ivkovic, Sialm and 
Weisbenner (2008) and is calculated as the sum of squared value weights of each stock in a household’s portfolio. Average portfolio 
value is the average mark-to-market value of an investor’s portfolio in Euros using daily closing prices, calculated on an annual basis. 
Trades Option is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one for traders that have traded options at least once over the entire sample 
period.  
 
 
Summary Statistics for Finland  
  Mean P25 Median P75 Std. Dev 
 
Stock Characteristics  
Price (€) 12.61 2.69 7.67 16.4 11.20 
Mkt Cap (€mil) 1132 33 125 498 8414.34 
AdjIlliq 10.61 1.07 6.21 20.12 10.25 
Roll's C 2.96 0.66 2.30 3.88 3.51 
Zerofreq 21.90% 13.50% 20.64% 27.75% 13.42% 
     
 
 
Investor Characteristics  
Age in 1995 39.5 27 40 52 18.48 
Gender (1=female) 0.33 0 0 1 0.47 
Portfolio Concentration 0.20 0.09 0.17 0.27 0.18 
Average Portfolio Value, EUR 10,823 1,341 2,079 5,292 80,125 
Trades Option 0.04 0 0 0 0.18 
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Table 8: Impact of Liquidity on Households’ Holding Periods in Finland, hazard analysis 
Table 8 examines the impact of stock liquidity on individual investors’ holding periods in Finland using a hazard model 
framework. Panel A reports estimated hazard ratios from the hazard regressions where the conditional probability of sale is the 
dependent variable. Independent variables include measures of liquidity: the adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio (alternative 
proxies for transactions costs including Roll’s C and Zerofreq); firm characteristics; a set of demographic controls; trade 
variables; as well as the interaction of our proxy for transactions costs with investor characteristics. Proxies for transactions 
costs (AdjIlliq, Roll’s C and Zerofreq) are calculated over the previous 12 months prior to a sale transaction. Size is the market 
value of equity. B/M , the book-to-market ratio, is computed as the ratio of previous year-end book value to the most recent 
market capitalization. Momentum is the cumulative return over the period between month -12 to month -2. All stock 
characteristics are calculated at the beginning of the month that a sale takes place. Demographic variables include age and 
gender. Age is the biological age of the head of the household. Male Dummy is one if the head of the household is male. Trade 
variables for each investor are derived from all the transactions carried out by the each specific investor in the dataset. Option 
User Dummy equals one if an investor has ever traded options over the course of the sample period. Log (Equity Holding) 
captures the logarithmic value of the household’s total equity holdings. Concentration is defined as in Ivkovic, Sialm and 
Weisbenner (2008) and is equal to the sum of squared value weights of each stock in a household’s portfolio. Year Dummies 
are dummy variables that equal one if the sale transaction takes place during that particular year. Calendar month dummy is 
equal one if a sale takes place during that particular month. For brevity, estimated hazard ratios on the year and month dummy 
variables are not reported. Panel B investigates if sophistication affects an investor’s attention to transaction costs. A Finnish 
investor’s sophistication is presumed to cumulatively increase with each of the following criteria met: if the household is ranked 
among the top 25% of all investors based on equity holdings at any point in time during the sample period; if the investor’s 
portfolio is more concentrated than the median investor’s; if the investor has ever traded options at least once during the entire 
sample period. The most sophisticated investors in Finland have a Sophistication score of three (3), while the least sophisticated 
have a Sophistication score of zero (0). We also control for size, B/M, momentum, as well as calendar year and month specific 
effects. Robust standard errors are calculated as in Lin and Wei (1989). Ties are handled using the Efron procedure. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Panel A: Hazard Regressions, Impact of Transaction Costs on Individual Traders’ Holding Period Decisions in Finland 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
  AdjIlliq Roll's C Zerofreq AdjIlliq AdjIlliq AdjIlliq  
Illiquidity measure 0.984
***
 0.975
***
 0.105
***
 0.976
***
 0.982
***
 0.982
***
  
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  
  Stock characteristics   
Size 
 
  
 
1.003
***
 1.001 
***
 
 
  
  
 
<.0001 <.0001 
 
BM 
 
  
 
0.993
***
 0.996
***
 
 
  
  
 
<.0001 <.0001 
 
Momentum 
 
  
 
1.014
***
 1.008
***
 
 
  
  
 
<.0001 <.0001 
 
  Demographic Controls 
Age 
 
  
  
0.994
***
 
 
  
  
  
<.0001 
 
Male Dummy 
 
  
  
1.290
***
 
 
  
  
  
<.0001 
 
  Trade Variables 
Option User Dummy 
 
  
  
1.713
***
 
 
  
  
  
<.0001 
 Log (Equity Holding) 
 
  
  
1.157
***
 
 
  
  
  
<.0001 
 Concentration 
 
  
  
5.456
***
 
  
  
  
<.0001 
        
Firm stratification No No No Yes No   No  
Household stratification No No No Yes Yes No  
Calendar month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Calendar year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 2,304,232 2,304,232 2,304,232 2,304,232 2,131,366 1,522,716  
Wald test <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  
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Panel B: Hazard Regressions, Impact of Sophistication on Attention to Transaction Costs in Finland 
 
 (1) (2)   
Illiquidity measure 1.005*** 1.013
***
   
  <.0001 <.0001   
Age 0.995*** 0.995
***
   
  <.0001 <.0001   
Male Dummy 1.371*** 1.339
***
   
  <.0001 <.0001   
Sophistication  1.588*** 1.552
***
   
  <.0001 <.0001   
AdjIlliq × Age  1.000*** 1.000   
  <.0001 0.236   
AdjIlliq × Male Dummy 0.990*** 0.992
***
   
  <.0001 <.0001   
AdjIlliq × Sophistication 0.996*** 0.997
***
   
  <.0001 <.0001   
Stock Controls Yes Yes   
Household stratification No Yes   
Calendar month dummies Yes Yes   
Calendar year dummies Yes Yes   
Observations 1,522,716 1,522,716   
Wald test <.0001 <.0001   
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Figure 1: Holding Periods of Households 
 
 
 
 
This figure shows the median holding period for various investor and stock groups.  Age is the age of the investor.  Account 
type denotes whether the account is a retirement account.  Investment value is the average amount invested by the household in 
the stock market.  A stock is defined as illiquid if it belongs to the lowest liquidity decile of stocks ranked according to the 
adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio. The holding period is calculated only for positions that are closed-out by the end of the 
sample period. 
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Figure 2: Survival Probabilities for Stocks in the United States 
 
Figure 2 plots Kaplan-Meier survival probabilities for two groups of stocks held by households in the United States over the 
1991-1996 time period. Illiquid stocks in the figure are stocks that are in the highest illiquidity decile of stocks ranked 
according to the adjusted Amihud illiquidity measure. The gray line stands for the probability of holding onto illiquid stocks, 
and the black line stands for the probability of holding all the rest stocks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Investor Sophistication and Hazard Ratios 
 
 
Figure 3 plots the hazard ratios of the variable AdjIlliq computed by running separate regressions for different groups of 
investors based on their level of sophistication indicated in the x-axis. Sophistication ranges from a low of zero (0) to a high of 
seven (7). The regression model used is the same as in column (1) of Panel B in Table 3.  The dotted lines show the 95
th
 
percentile confidence intervals of the estimated hazard ratios.  
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